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FINNISH SECURITY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Stephen J. Blank

19961107 081

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
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September 27, 1996



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FOREWORD

In 1995 Finland joined the European Union (EU). This action culminated several years of a fundamental re-orientation of Finnish security policy as Finland moved from the neutrality imposed on it by the Soviet Union to a policy with a priority on European integration through the European Union. Finland, in joining the EU, has retained its independent defense and security posture, even as it seeks to strengthen its standing abroad and gain added leverage, through the EU, for dealing with Russia. Finland's odyssey indicates much about two fundamental issues in European security: coping with Russia's crises, and the interrelationship between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as providers of security for small states in Europe.

Furthermore, Finland's proximity to Russia and the difficult history of Fenno-Russian relations have imposed on Finnish policymakers the need for penetrating and sober analysis of Finland's and Europe's security situation. Therefore, Finland's evolution from an imposed neutrality to overt participation in European integration merits our careful scrutiny and attention.



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SUMMARY

When Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, it completed a fundamental transformation of its security policy. Until the end of the Cold War, Finland's position in Europe derived from its treaty with the Soviet Union which imposed neutrality upon it and debarred Finland from any security cooperation with Scandinavia, Western Europe, and the United States. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union allowed Finland to move towards European integration through the EU while preserving its own independent defense posture. Other reasons for moving towards the EU stemmed from Finland's new economic vulnerability to trends in the European economy, and its determination that current security challenges no longer included the Cold War threat of military invasion. Rather, current dangers involved the risk of a collapse of Russia's social or political infrastructure which could then confront Helsinki with challenges that it could not meet alone.

Therefore, Finland needed to find ways of associating with other states to meet those nonmilitary challenges and, at the same time, terminate its erstwhile political isolation by participating in European integration. It chose the EU over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because the expansion of NATO to its border would have alarmed Moscow and because Helsinki viewed the threats to Europe as being essentially nonmilitary, and thus outside NATO's mandate or purview. Also, as Finland emerged from the Cold War, it found itself exposed to severe economic dislocations, if not crises, that forced integration upon both it and Sweden (whose international economic lead Finland had to follow).

But, by opting for EU and European integration, Finland stimulated fears at home that it was abandoning its reliance on self-defense and chasing what might prove to be an elusive form of indirect political guarantees in future crises.

Other domestic groups worried that Finland might be drawn into European crises of others' making where it had no say in decisionmaking since it was outside the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As a result, the decision to join the EU forced a major domestic debate which was won in 1994 by supporters of membership, and which also led to publication of a *White Paper* on Finnish security in 1995.

The Finnish Government published the 1995 *White Paper* to educate Finnish elites and masses as to the purposes behind Finland's policy and in order to give it a formal public statement. The *White Paper* retains Finland's commitment to independent defense. It also reflects Finland's support for a strengthened EU/WEU capability for crisis management, peace operations, and for dealing with the challenges posed by Russia's current crisis. The *White Paper* lists the threats that could engage Finland due to Russia's crisis. These threats pertain mainly to the possible breakdown of socio-political order in Russia, the consequences of which would rapidly spread towards Finland and the Baltic states while overwhelming those states' ability to confront those challenges.

The *White Paper* both reaffirmed and carried forward the policy perspectives that had developed in 1992-94 as Finland prepared for accession to the EU. It also reflected Finnish policymakers' belief that EU membership opened the way to overcome Finland's prior political isolation and even attain indirect security guarantees. At the same time, Finland preserved its independent defense capability.

But by 1995, when the *White Paper* came out, other Finnish statements indicated a belief that the Western European Union (WEU), the military arm, so to speak, of the EU, could become an institution devoted to peace operations and crisis management and that Finland could safely associate with the WEU for such operations. The WEU, combined with NATO's Partnership for Peace program that began in 1994, could become vehicles for Finland's military integration with Europe and progress towards achieving real, as opposed to indirect, security

guarantees from Europe and even, possibly, from the United States.

Finland has apparently come around to advocating this position. It participates in the Partnership for Peace program and accepts the EU/WEU as a security provider for instances where peacemaking or peacekeeping forces are needed or for purely political or economic issues. At the same time, Finland rejects the idea that the WEU could be a parallel pillar or alternative to NATO. As for self-defense, Finland remains as strongly committed as before to providing its own robust self-defense against threats to its integrity or sovereignty. One reason for Helsinki's position is its belief that Finnish admission to the WEU would again unnecessarily provoke Russia since Russia has clearly indicated its apprehension about Finnish membership in any European military alliance system.

However, Finland has crafted its evolving position with such care that if its perspective on its role in European security issues is accepted abroad, then Finland could come as close as possible to NATO membership without formal membership in it. Similarly Finland could come as close as possible to real political, if not necessarily defense guarantees from either the WEU or even NATO in the future. Its objectives are to maximize Finnish room for maneuver and flexibility, while avoiding any directly provocative actions against Moscow. Thus self-defense remains the foundation of its position in Europe even as Helsinki aspires to membership in the overall process of European integration.

Finland's subtle and evolving policy represents a substantial departure from its previous, Cold War posture; this is especially true in regard to NATO membership. Since avoiding conflict and direct confrontation with Russia are Finland's top priorities, and NATO expansion would spark such confrontation, Finland must balance deterrence against Russia with reassurance that it will not become a hostile base for anti-Russian activities and the need to pursue European integration further (to secure itself against nonmilitary threats and gain support if such threats

do emerge). For Finland, therefore, NATO expansion should take place with maximum transparency, consultation, and gradualness so that Finland does not become "a front-line state."

Similar goals apply to Finland's relationship with the Baltic states. Finland's nuanced approach to Russia is not always appreciated in those states whose emotional recollections of Soviet/Russian oppression distort their policies. But, Finland is working with them and other Nordic and Western states to relieve sources of tension and subject them to international mediation processes, and to bring the Baltic states into Europe in a nonprovocative fashion that emulates Finland's own odyssey. Just as Finland wants Russia integrated into as many European channels as possible, so, too, does it want the Baltic states equally enmeshed in those European networks as a means of preserving regional peace in the Baltic. To the degree that Baltic security issues are internationalized, peace remains secure, everyone is consulted, and the Baltic states are not left face to face with Russia.

Obviously not everyone will appreciate Finnish goals and perspectives which contradict the vision of the WEU as a "European pillar" that provides for Europe's defense as distinct from NATO. Nonetheless, Finland's policy and vision combines self-defense, a nonprovocative policy that sponsors Russia's integration into Europe, and Finland's own integration with Europe into a cohesive whole. For small states which must operate in the shadow of a *status quo* set by others and where sub-regional organizations cannot provide defense against potential threats, Finland might well become a model of how to proceed in building individual, regional, and even European security.

FINNISH SECURITY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

Introduction.

In 1992 Finland applied to join the European Union (EU). It formally entered the EU 3 years later. This decision to join the EU reflected several fundamental changes in Finnish policy. By applying to, and joining, the EU, Finland renounced the Cold War policy of neutrality imposed by the 1948 Fenno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) and embraced integration with Europe. Membership in the EU also represents Finland's newly-gained ability to think about its security in broader terms than from 1944, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) defeated Finland and compelled it to leave World War II, until 1991, when the Soviet Union fell apart. From 1944-91, "defense" and "security" were almost synonymous in Finnish thinking; policy focused almost solely upon not provoking Moscow. Issues of economic security and economic integration with Europe had relatively little significance for Helsinki compared to the need to define a working relationship with Moscow and safeguard Finnish independence. Once the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, Helsinki sought to defend Finnish independence by joining Europe. Finnish goals were to obtain more freedom of action, a broader sense of security, and political support from the EU and, more generally, from the West.

Finland's strategic importance to Russia, Scandinavia, and the Baltic littoral imparts considerable relevance to its evolving outlook on European security; therefore, Helsinki's thinking merits serious attention abroad. Thus, the evolution of Finnish views from the time it applied to the EU (1992) to the present has considerable significance for both regional security in the Baltic and for European security more generally. The decision to join the EU resulted

from both a long internal debate and the changed international situation at the end of the Cold War. To grasp Finland's policies we must examine the decision to join the EU, its internal debate and what Finland hopes to gain from joining, its views on European integration and security organizations (i.e., the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), the future of European security, and Finnish policy towards Russia and the Baltic states.

The Decision to Enter the EU.

Finland's application to the EU owes much to its situation at the end of the Cold War and to the fact that in 1991 Sweden applied to the EU first.¹ Before that, Finland was not part of any bloc, and its formal ties to the Soviet-bloc Baltic littoral states were quite limited. There were no formal political relations with the Baltic republics, which had yet to gain their independence.

Instead, the 1947 Peace Treaty, the 1948 FCMA Treaty, and Finland's proximity to the USSR determined the contours of its policy. The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty set limits to the size of Finland's armed forces (although it did not prohibit a large reserve force) and excluded military equipment of an "offensive nature."² The FCMA treaty conceded Finland's right to self-defense, but debarred it from joining any bloc and becoming a base for foreign armed forces against the Soviet Union. Thus, the FCMA treaty offered Moscow numerous opportunities to press Finland to abandon neutrality and forced a highly circumspect policy upon Helsinki. Finland had to choose neutrality of a special sort that both blocs would accept.

Neutrality, a distinct and defining attribute of the Cold War division of Europe, was an impediment to a truly independent security policy for Finland. Helsinki had a very circumscribed field of maneuver. Finnish neutrality precluded significant regional defense cooperation with Sweden, other Scandinavian or Baltic littoral states, the EU and NATO. Thus, Finland was outside regional defense

systems such as NATO, which guaranteed Scandinavian states like Norway and Denmark against attack, and which Sweden also believed provided an indirect guarantee of its defense. Finland also acted with great caution towards the emerging Baltic independence movements in the Soviet Union, only beginning a very low-level cooperation with them in 1990.³

As the Cold War faded, neutrality became irrelevant when there were no longer any hostile European blocs. As Soviet pressure ebbed after the late 1980s, Finland also could act more independently in foreign policy. Thus, in 1990 it unilaterally renounced the terms of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty relating to restrictions on its armed forces stemming from its cooperation with Germany in World War II (Part III of the treaty) so that it could act on its own to end all claims upon the reunified Germany. The other sections of the treaty, dealing with postwar border changes and reparations, were left intact, but Finland nevertheless showed its growing interest and ability to obtain more freedom of action abroad.⁴

As neutrality waned, other forces pushed Finland toward EU integration. It became clear after 1991 that Eastern Europe wanted a return to Europe, not neutrality, and that the only available form of European integration seemed to be the EU. The crises since 1991—Yugoslavia, the abortive Soviet coup of 1991, Russia's long-term instability, and the general European economic recession after 1992—all forced Finland to realize that its previous policies had been superseded and were now risks to its security.⁵

The end of the Cold War opened a new era for Finland, but in 1992 it appeared to Helsinki as if Cold War polarity would be replaced by division into center versus periphery or rich nations versus poor. As Finland had been outside the Cold War blocs, it now risked being consigned to Europe's periphery if it did not move closer to the EU. At least publicly, Finland also had to cede more importance to economic issues in its overall security policy or risk becoming part of Europe's economic periphery.⁶ Nevertheless, it remained a captive of its location:

Traditional neutrality no longer has the same significance as it had during the cold war—Finland's foreign policy leadership wants our country to be outside the European periphery both economically and politically. The many elements of uncertainty in Russia's development have also forced Finland to participate more closely in European economic, political, and military integration. Still, Finland's future choice of policy will be determined not so much by the fear of the negative effects of Russia's unstable development as by a positive desire to forge close links with the economically and militarily strong central area of Europe. Our relationship with Russia is, however, the most important single factor as far as Finland is concerned, owing to its geographical position.⁷

The recession of 1992-95, partly caused by the 1992 crash of European currencies due to the Bundesbank's deflationary policies, also pushed an end to neutrality. It forced Finland to reorganize its economic policy and commit itself more fully to European integration and domestic restructuring. Due to earlier mistaken economic policies, Finland, by 1994, was the hardest hit of all European economies, making fundamental reforms necessary.⁸ Meanwhile, the end of the Soviet Union and the FCMA treaty regime led to a new Russo-Finnish Treaty that stressed a common support for market economies and, thus, greater equality *vis-a-vis* Russia. Finnish analysts noted that normal economic actors in a market relationship do not need an FCMA treaty that was an instrument of subordination; rather, they meet as equals. They claimed that Finland's existing market economy actually gives it an advantage *vis-a-vis* Russia.⁹ Therefore, for all these reasons (Finland's economic security, the need to overcome international economic threats, the changed dimensions of the European security agenda, and the changed environment for relations with Russia), Finland deemed it necessary to approach the EU.

European integration through the EU entails some sacrifice of autonomy in economic and (potentially) security policy since the EU's Maastricht Treaty calls for integrated economic policies and currencies, as well as common foreign and security policies (CFSP), but there are compensations.

There are those who claim that for Western European states, "membership in the European Union—is in itself a major security guarantee and even a sufficient security guarantee for almost any country."¹⁰ While this claim is almost certainly exaggerated, EU membership surely enhances political integration and indirect assurances of political security by creating a climate where Finland is regarded as a member of the club and is integrating into Europe.

In 1994, Alpo Rusi, a key advisor to President Martti Ahtisaari, presented a public rationale for joining the EU. He observed that because the EU is becoming the framework for European integration, EU membership offers small states a chance to influence European developments rather than being passive objects of European trends.¹¹ At the same time, only the EU can help stabilize the neighboring Russian provinces of St. Petersburg and Karelia and contribute thereby to Finnish and Russian security.

The EU is the preferable organization to join because the regional threats to Finnish stability are essentially non-military in origin and nature.¹² These threats relate to a potential economic breakdown, ecological dangers, social upheaval, crime, uncontrolled immigration, etc. Because NATO relates primarily to issues of military defense, Rusi argued, its expansion could destabilize Russian reform and is harmful, if not irrelevant, to the real security challenges around Finland.¹³

Rusi supported preservation of the Northern European balance because that *status quo* contributes to regional security. Although NATO's posture guarantees the region, expanding NATO could provoke Russia into more confrontational postures and policies and deflect it from resolving its domestic problems—the real threat to security. He also refuted NATO expansion by claiming that Norway's membership in NATO (and the ensuing guarantee to its defense) already indirectly strengthen Finnish and Swedish security.¹⁴ Since applicants to the EU like Finland are satisfied with the *status quo*, the EU's evolution into a

military power is therefore not to their interests, but quite the contrary. Instead, Rusi claimed, the EU's expansion would offer the Baltic and Scandinavian countries more leverage *vis-a-vis* Russia.¹⁵

Finally, Rusi argued more broadly that the post-Cold War era is usually typified by new threats that generally cannot be deterred by military means. While deterrence is still needed against armed attacks, the real threat is Europe's economic-social cleavage into rich and poor. Cooperative solutions that involve new institutions are also necessary, but they cannot overcome that division of Europe. Only the EU can do that. Therefore, applicants need the EU not so much for military security, but precisely for its stabilizing potential. The EU's enlargement becomes the royal road to overcome fundamental socio-economic challenges and stabilize European security.¹⁶

Rusi's ideas also became or reflected the official consensus. After 1992 official rationales for joining the EU moved from stressing economic security. Instead, they focused on a vision of the EU as the center of a greater process of European integration where Finnish security was more broadly conceived.¹⁷

Of course, policy does not emerge solely on the basis of a logical analysis. Finland still faces a formidable neighbor. Northern Europe's military division has not changed. Russia still faces the West here. Indeed, the North is more crucial than ever to Russia because its nuclear-fuelled ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet is essentially concentrated there and strategic arms treaties appear to be forcing Russia to deploy ever greater percentages of its strategic weapons at sea. Russian conventional forces are also more concentrated in the Leningrad Military District as a result of the evacuation of Central Europe.

Outside events can also affect policy. Sweden's 1991 application to the EU forced Helsinki's hand. To balance the earlier forced military-political inclination to Moscow, Helsinki had devised a cardinal policy principle that it could not afford to remain outside any economic organization

involving Sweden and Finland's main customers, Germany and Great Britain. Otherwise Swedish paper and metalworking industries would capture those markets and marginalize Finnish exports (and presence) in Western Europe. This principle led Finland to join free trade agreements such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Community Organization (the EU's parent organization) in Sweden's wake. Swedish neutrality was also the western anchor that allowed Finland to preserve its neutrality under Soviet pressure since it could argue that since Sweden, too, was neutral, there was no regional threat to Moscow and, therefore, no need for Finland to compromise its neutrality. Thus, Sweden's 1991 application to the EU deprived Finland of security options other than increased defense spending or reorientation to either of Europe's two major blocs; this underscored Finland's isolation from the Nordic community and its key markets.¹⁸ Although major domestic lobbies benefitting from a relatively privileged trading position with Moscow still hoped to continue that relationship, Sweden forced Finland's hand before it was ready.¹⁹ Luckily, the Soviet collapse allowed Finland to apply to the EU, which it then did with alacrity in 1992.

Nevertheless, the decision to enter the EU has serious consequences for Finland's overall security policy. It forces Helsinki at some future point to rely for its security on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the WEU, NATO, or some other, as yet unseen, alternative. The EU, too, worried that Finland's attachment to neutrality could put Finland at odds, a concern that probably led Finland in 1993 to pledge its support to work for a CFSP, as agreed at Maastricht.²⁰

But, this decision led to domestic attacks on the government for not having a security doctrine that spelled out how Finland would evade the CFSP and keep a viable independent defense. One critic observed,

It looks as though Finland's inverse strategy tends to be the avoidance of making strategic decisions, not participating in strategic decisions, not committing ourselves to the solution of

problems, being satisfied with military “service-level” missions, but nonetheless entertaining indirect hopes of aid from union countries (WEU/NATO) if our own security fails us Thus Finland is now joining the EU without a clear-cut doctrine on its own security.²¹

This criticism also overlooked the fact that the decision to join the EU indicated the government’s desire to integrate with Europe and its belief in the efficacy of doing so as a hedge against any future threats that might ensue from Russia—not just an invasion, but the potential collapse of Russia’s civil infrastructure, or action against the Baltic states.²² At no time did the government contemplate giving up its doctrine of a robust, independent defense. But these charges had to be answered at home, making membership in the EU the subject of a national referendum in 1994. Thus, the decision to join the EU, especially as its rationale moved from economics to security, triggered a grand debate over Finnish security policy, rival views of European security, and Finland’s place in Europe.

The Finnish Debate over the EU.

The Finnish debate over the EU was part of a greater debate within European circles. One Continentalist school of thought placed its faith in the evolution of the EU and the WEU as Europe’s primary security agent, while another Atlanticist school emphasized NATO and the Transatlantic connection. While the Continentalists argued on the basis of Europe’s ever-deepening security integration, the Atlanticists pointed to the reality of NATO’s function as a force for stability.²³ Although sectoral or economic concerns about the restructuring imposed by membership in the EU—and dramatized by the concurrent economic crisis—were expressed, apparently both groups’ main concern in this debate was for neutrality and independence.

At home many analysts worried that by remaining an uncommitted observer at the WEU, Finland would be isolated from Europe and could be drawn into conflict situations with Russia. Or, it might be dragged into EU conflicts of little concern to it and where it had no control

over the previous decision-making process, e.g., Yugoslavia.²⁴ Some feared that Finnish self-defense capability and/or aloofness from distant European conflicts could then be weakened without compensating gains.

The debates that now opened up the first open public discussion of security policy since 1948²⁵ revolved around the Continental or Atlantic defense options, those who believed that Russia was a threat that must be confronted, those who argued that Russia was a state that could be managed, and those who wanted to keep all options open.²⁶ Alternatively the debate could be depicted as dividing those who claimed that neutrality had been a "pragmatic" way to defend Finnish interests and those who felt neutrality was a fundamental "principle" applicable to all foreign policy questions other than actual self-defense. For the pragmatists, the real challenge to the concept of neutrality was Europe's unceasing economic integration, not the current security situation. In a Europe where that integration led to a decline of military factors' importance in policy, Finland could become part of the interdependent whole only by finding a way other than neutrality to defend its national interests.²⁷ Opposing this reasoning, "fundamentalists," like former Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, argued for universalizing the neutrality principle.

In foreign trade policy Finland has developed special neutrality policy principles in the form of a balanced integration with neighbouring areas as well as global principles of universality and non-discrimination. These principles also include the policy of non-participation in supra-national decision-making.²⁸

That stand would, of course, have precluded joining the EU.

Three other factors complicated Finland's debate. One was the fact that after Carl Bildt's Conservative Swedish Government renounced neutrality in 1992-94, going so far as to say it would participate in defending the Baltic states against a Russian invasion, the succeeding Swedish Socialist government in 1995 returned to an even stricter

policy of military nonintervention and neutrality. This nullified the effectiveness of any NATO membership for Finland (since NATO's ability to help Finland would be greatly limited by Sweden's neutrality) and it restricted Swedish military planning, even though the Swedish military has long sought more formal cooperation with Finland.²⁹ The second factor is that until NATO decides who will join and when it will admit new members, Finland cannot afford to apply and be rejected. So, Finland was consigned to watchful waiting and reliance on the EU as Europe's situation clarifies.³⁰ A third factor, one that could never be fully stated in public yet is understood by all, is that failure to join the EU could leave Finland isolated and next to Russia. At present the whole object of Finnish policy is to prevent that possibility without giving Russia grounds for threats to Finland or its interests. Therefore, "the prevailing strategy is to strengthen collective actions which also improve the European institutional structure and its ability to deal with the challenge of Russia without adding confrontational elements to relations between Russia and Europe."³¹ Under these conditions, it follows that membership in the EU and an independent defense remain Finland's best options.

This debate presented Finnish leaders with novel challenges, especially as the vital questions of Russia's orientation and the security of the new Baltic states remained undecided in 1992. But, the government's report to parliament then stressed that military neutrality, i.e., Finland's exemption from foreign bases and reliance on its own robust forces and command and control would not be impugned by joining the EU.³² In 1992-93, Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn and CINC Admiral Jan Klenberg first defended the applications to the EU and for observer status in the WEU because they preserved neutrality in foreign conflicts, safeguarded Finland's independent defense capability, reassured Moscow that its enemies were not approaching, and provided political support against the possibility of being marginalized or isolated in Europe.³³ Nonetheless, the debate lasted through 1994 and the height

of the economic crisis when the referendum decided positively for membership.

Finland and the Future of European Security.

To meet the pressure for a public statement and to state their goals, Finnish officials went public both individually and in the form of the 1995 *White Paper* on Security Policy. The ideas in the *White Paper* are not new; they match statements developed in 1992-94 by President Ahtisaari and the then-Esko Aho government. Many of those policy statements were carried forward when Paavo Lipponen's Social Democrats came to power in the 1995 elections. As early as 1993, Jaakko Blomberg, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, forecasted many points in the *White Paper* and outlined Finland's cautious European policy.

Blomberg noted, first of all, that Finnish policy is shaped within the triangle "Moscow-Berlin-Stockholm," and that Helsinki now also had to add the Baltic states to the crucial and complex framework of its security policy. Second, the new importance of Russia's north—the heart of its naval strategic potential—had made the area more important to both superpowers and to Finland by bringing the United States, in particular, closer to it. While Cold War political rivalry had ended, mutually deterrent military structures still prevailed in Northern Europe. Third, Finland expected united Germany to play a much greater role in the Baltic. Fourth, helping to stabilize Russia's transition was a vital Finnish interest. Fifth, neutrality was not relevant in a Europe increasingly committed to the common security project inherent in the CSCE (after 1995 OSCE), the 1975 Helsinki Treaty, and subsequent documents of the CSCE process.³⁴

Therefore, Blomberg argued that Finland, by applying to the EU, was not renouncing its independent defense and nonalignment. Nor was it threatening Russia. As before, Finland would defend against Russia, but not threaten it or actively join a hostile anti-Russian bloc. But, by joining the

EU, Finland would be better able to support peaceful democratic change in Europe on the basis of prosperity and common security. As an EU member, Finland "would support the independence and security of the Community and its members in a spirit of solidarity, and would expect similar support in return for its own independence and security."³⁵ At the same time, by retaining its independent defense, Finland neither renounced its own capacities nor excluded future changes based on the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) of the EU. Any such change would be a result of the EU's unanimous decision.³⁶ Though self-defense would remain the basis of its policy, Finland could get greater and unprecedented political support for itself through European integration.

By 1995, Blomberg, however cautiously, was ready to go further. Not only were Finnish defense interests compatible with the EU's framework, it also was "not impossible that we could, with such an agreement, obtain credible security guarantees without a dangerous state of antagonism arising at the same time on Finland's borders."³⁷ If this outcome truly materialized, it would give Finland more freedom of action and true security than it ever had enjoyed—even if these guarantees were only indirect and not commitments to mutual defense. Blomberg further contended that the EU's evolution towards a CFSP under the Maastricht framework was now occurring in an unexpected direction, i.e., within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. NATO now talked about a distinct European security and defense identity (ESDI).

Functioning as its core, there is the entity made up of the EU and WEU, which concentrates on developing preparedness for peacekeeping and crisis management. This requires increased military cooperation No defence alliance is required for the union to develop its security identity for crisis management.³⁸

Blomberg clearly implied that by contributing its forces and experience in peace operations and crisis management to the WEU and by participating in the PfP, Finland could achieve more military-political integration with Europe in

a nonthreatening form that gave it hope for having more credible political guarantees (if not binding alliance commitments) than before. It is not for nothing that some Finnish officials call the PfP a "genius program of military cooperation."³⁹

Moreover, other Finnish officials supporting Blomberg stress that Helsinki under an evolutionary EU/WEU still retains its freedom of action and all its options. Indeed, it is now possible, under Finnish law's stringent provisions on when forces can be used abroad, to use Finnish troops (as in Bosnia) under an OSCE or UN mandate.⁴⁰ General Gustav Hagglund, Finland's Commander-in-Chief and the former commander of United Nation (UN) forces in Lebanon, has called for a crisis reaction brigade that can be mobilized and deployed, including reservists, active troops and NCOs, similar to Finland's UN forces. Those forces could be used for peace operations abroad or for Finnish defense.⁴¹ Thus, the EU/WEU's current evolution, especially regarding peace operations, could offer Finland unprecedented security advantages and eventually (potentially) real defense guarantees.

The views of Blomberg and his supporters quickly became those of the government as a whole. In May 1995, Premier Paavo Lipponen suggested that the WEU become an organization devoted primarily to peacekeeping and crisis management.⁴² In November 1995, he reiterated Finnish willingness to help plan such operations, noting "It is unrealistic to replace NATO with something European."⁴³ Earlier, in October, the Cabinet had proposed creating special standby forces within the military for utilization abroad in international crisis management. Risto Penttila, a member of Parliament and former researcher for the Defense Ministry, gave the rationale for this policy, namely that,

During a time of peace Finland should conduct a policy that would take our country as close to NATO membership as possible without Finland's formally joining the alliance. This means that Finland's defense organization is consistent with that of other EU and NATO countries, and that Finland has a

preparedness for participating in the operations of a European mercenary army with its own mercenary troops.⁴⁴

It also is clear that the PfP provides an international basis for doing so and facilitates Finnish military integration with Europe. Indeed, by autumn 1995, the Finnish media were proclaiming that Sweden and Finland were technically ready and eligible for NATO membership; only the political decision needed to be made by both governments and NATO, they claimed.⁴⁵

While NATO membership may be too precipitate a step for Finland, it is clear that Finnish views about membership in the EU and the WEU's mission contradict the idea that the WEU can and should supplant NATO. Therefore Finland had to clarify its views on Europe's evolving security structures. This is another reason why the government issued a *White Paper* on Finland and European security.

The White Paper.

The *White Paper* explicitly tries to define Finnish interests and perceptions in a still violent world where, nevertheless, a common security order is emerging in Europe on the basis of democracy and human rights.⁴⁶ Even so, the *White Paper* places a much greater stress on local security issues, such as Russia and the Baltic, rather than on general European themes. Clearly local concerns shape Helsinki's broader security vistas.

The *White Paper* forthrightly defends Finland's military policy of nonalliance and independent defense. Finnish military capability must ensure that Finland does not become the target of military speculation, let alone military force. The aim is to make use of force a nonoption even in crises smaller than war.⁴⁷ Europe's changing military situation has,

... not prompted any need to alter Finland's defence solution which relies on territorial defence of the whole country and a large reservist army based on universal military service, an

arrangement dictated by the country's large size, small population, and limited resources.⁴⁸

This point politely reminds Europe and the Finnish public that although the OSCE project endorses the indivisibility of European security, it has failed in Yugoslavia and *vis-a-vis* Russia. While the OSCE is acknowledged to be a norm-setting institution for Europe, the *White Paper* notes that security organizations have a practical significance based on their past record and the expectations attached to them. Ultimately their influence depends on states' political will to use them to solve security problems. Yugoslavia has tested all the European security institutions' credibility and found them wanting.⁴⁹ As General Owe Wiktorin, Chief of Sweden's General Staff, said, Yugoslavia taught small states (like Finland) that,

As a result of Bosnia and other armed conflicts we have come to accept war on European territory. The message is, in particular for a small nation, that if you do not take care of your security no one else may care.⁵⁰

Despite guarantees to the contrary, small European states in Central and Eastern Europe have to defend themselves because they are alone. European security, despite contrary claims, is, or has been until now, divisible. Multilateralism or collective security here are indeed of little value. The repercussions of this divisibility of European security are immense. In the *White Paper* and recent statements on continuing Finland's robust independent defense posture, one finds an undercurrent of unease about the failure of EU/WEU to move on security issues and on the divisibility of European security.

What then are the implications for Finland of the EU's failures? They are the need to find broader venues of political support abroad while preserving its independent defense capability. As the *White Paper* repeatedly indicates, Finland promotes Nordic collaboration.⁵¹ It also insists that its defense posture and status in the EU contribute to its ability to foster cooperative security in Europe.⁵² Nevertheless, the *White Paper* spells out the concept or

vision for the EU/WEU that Blomberg and other officials outlined in earlier statements or articles.

The primary task of the Union's defence dimension in the short term is to develop a capability for crisis management. The means to this are the strengthening of the WEU's operational and structural capabilities and cooperation between the WEU and NATO within the Combined Joint Task Forces model. Further building of the institutional relations between the EU and WEU in the light of the crisis management role can be discussed at the intergovernmental conference of the EU in 1996.⁵³

While Finland will defend itself against attack or threats, the WEU should limit itself to crisis management and peace operations. Although President Ahtisaari does not see such EU/WEU integration as discussed by Blomberg as occurring anytime soon, he does favor these organizations' closer cooperation on the basis of their current evolution.⁵⁴ At the same time, he noted that the development of a rapid reaction force for use in Bosnia or other similar contingencies also strengthens Finland's own defense capability.⁵⁵ In fact, Paavo Lipponen observed that if the WEU decided to confine itself to peacekeeping and crisis management, Finland might change its attitude and join it. But that would mean the WEU renounced all hope of becoming a separate European pillar that somehow substituted for NATO or replaced it when Washington would not act.⁵⁶ The WEU then would only be the European pillar of NATO, which would remain the only indisputably effective military organization for European security.⁵⁷

Finland must therefore confront the question of what happens if the WEU and/or the EU fails to develop as intended. Or to put it differently, Helsinki must confront the lessons Wiktorin draws from Yugoslavia. For President Ahtisaari, the ideal of common or cooperative security for Finland is based on first, economic and political integration and bilateral ties among states, then preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and crisis management through the OSCE, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), PfP, WEU, and NATO, and finally Finland's reliance upon its

independent military capability. That structure will be undone if the EU/WEU continues to fail to evolve a credible defense policy.⁵⁸ Up to now the EU option supposedly gave Finland the maximum available indirect security guarantees of a collective European response to threats to it, consonant with Russian willingness to accept Finland's integration into Europe.⁵⁹ But if the EU fails to develop along such lines, Finland will then have no credible option other than self-defense when confronted by Russia.

One must agree with defense analyst Tomas Ries concerning the stakes of the game for Helsinki. Ries notes that by joining the EU Finland has slammed the door on its past policies whose priority was, above all, good relations with Russia. While membership in the EU is intended to help Finland cope with challenges stemming from Russia, it also indicates that Finland will now first exercise its European option in dealing with Russia, and not face Russia alone, as before. Since Russia today is evidently in an anti-Western phase,

Finland has very heavy stakes in the security-political vigor of the organization she is joining. In this respect Finland is—more than any other Nordic applicant—strongly dependent on the political as well as economic success of the European Union. For without a politically strong European Union Finland risks being stranded in a very dangerous situation. From this perspective Finland should be one of the strongest proponents of the continued political deepening [of the EU]—including in the area of the CFSP of the EU.⁶⁰

Finland and NATO.

Finland's relationship to NATO becomes a difficult political issue that must be faced. Finnish thinking about the WEU and NATO offers both a possible answer to Ries' analysis of potential threats to Finland if the EU fails to evolve as hoped and a chance to develop military-political collaboration, and even integration, with all other European agencies, including NATO, through the PfP.⁶¹ At the same time, apart from its highly negative impact on Russia, a NATO guarantee to Finland would be extremely difficult to

realize in view of Swedish neutrality.⁶² While Finland accepts that preserving NATO's ability to defend its core members is a basic prerequisite for Northern European and continental security, Finland must be able to count on solid guarantees and to defend its own interests.⁶³

The question of Finnish membership in NATO or security guarantee is directly related to Finland's geographical location. As General Gustav Hagglund observed, Finnish membership in the EU makes Finland's border with Russia the EU's border. Any tension between the EU and Russia could bring that border into focus. Avoiding such political conflict is Finland's "top priority." While Russia welcomed Finland's membership in the EU, Hagglund rightly noted that Russia has said that Finnish membership in NATO "would force Russia to reassess its policy and increase its military forces in those areas bordering on Finland."⁶⁴ Hagglund argues that Finnish defense policy currently produces a robust independent defense; therefore, Finland does not now need a NATO membership or guarantee. What it does need is a well-oiled mechanism for dealing with local crises and, therefore, the enhancement of a reliable European crisis management and peace operations agency. He expressed concern about U.S. willingness to intervene in purely domestic European conflicts and about NATO's expansion producing a new division of Europe. Instead, he strongly favored continuing the PfP which could increase security without isolating Russia. Custom-made and clearly defined security guarantees could be added to PfP without estranging Russia or diminishing the security of any PfP member who might experience threats. Indeed, Finland's defense model merits emulation by Central and East Europe under the PfP, while simultaneously expanding the EU would not increase instability in Europe. Expanding NATO would be provocative and actually lessen Finland's ability to deal with future local crises.⁶⁵

In a series of 1995 statements, Lipponen further refined this stance towards NATO. Replying to Russia's public concerns about Finnish membership in NATO, he noted that

Finland had many options, and that the existing balance in its relations with Moscow and Europe is a function of its membership in the EU (a fundamental reversal of the whole 1948-91 policy of thinking about Russia first that surprisingly evoked little response at home or abroad). Moreover, Finland does not now need NATO membership thanks to this balance in its foreign relations. Thus, Finland's options depend on Russian developments. In other words, the onus is on Russia, not Finland, to maintain security.⁶⁶ Discussions of Finland's NATO membership are, perhaps, misguided. Former Foreign Minister Heikki Haavisto correctly noted as far back as 1993 that NATO has renounced taking in new members anytime soon.⁶⁷ Three years later, NATO has not yet found expansion to be an urgent necessity, confirming Finland's refusal until now to apply for that membership. Indeed, one gets the impression the government would like the issue of Finland and NATO to go away from the headlines. Lipponen even denounced talk of NATO membership as idle chatter.⁶⁸ But even so, it is clear that Finland retains its option to join NATO if things change.

Meanwhile, officials are more concerned than they will admit that Sweden went back to neutrality and that the EU has failed to date in security. As Lipponen observed, "The EU is forced to bear the responsibility, but despite this it cannot influence anything through its current crisis intervention and decision-making system."⁶⁹ This situation leaves Finland with few options other than self-defense and NATO's current prolonged and cautious expansion based on thorough discussions with Moscow and "no vetoes and no surprises." Otherwise, fears that NATO expansion will provoke Russia and lessen Finland's ability to deal with local crises will materialize, and Finland will once again be alone face-to-face with an irate Russia.

Similar attitudes emerged during interviews with Finnish officials. They noted the continuing division in NATO over its expansion and also stressed that an effective defense capability is more important than collective foreign defense guarantees. This capability makes it difficult for

Russia, under the best of circumstances, to attack Finland; Russia today is far from having the interest, need, resources, or will to do so. Therefore, if NATO does expand, Finland would be best served by a process having maximum transparency, i.e., "no surprises nor vetoes," and thus no division of Europe into spheres of influence, e.g., those in and those out of NATO and thus in Russia's sphere. Rapid NATO expansion, particularly into the Baltic states, constitutes a highly provocative act that could actually turn the Baltic into a grey zone and tempt Russia back into it as many Russian planner would seem to want.⁷⁰ For the same reason of preventing provocative acts or the capability for conducting them, Finland opposed revising the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to allow Russia more forces in the Leningrad Military District. Therefore, in Helsinki's view, the expanding contacts through the PfP and using the WEU for peace operations and crisis management, not new functions, best serve both the WEU and Finnish interests.⁷¹

Foreign observers also agree that Finland has a paramount interest in NATO remaining an efficient, credible, and effective defense system. Ideally for Helsinki this means that if NATO is to expand and Finland to join it, NATO should do so over time to assuage Russian fears and prevent threats to Finland in response to its entry into NATO. The attainment of this situation in Europe would mean that NATO and Europe had moved decisively in the direction of a true collective security system on a pan-European scale based on structures of confidence with Russia and other nonmembers. Or, in other words, Finland can safely join NATO when Russia is fully integrated into a European security system. As Hansrudolf Kramer noted, "If NATO develops into a genuine system of collective security, Russia will have to participate in it in some form or other. In that case, Finland could participate in it as well."⁷² Since NATO expansion will take a long time but Russia's reaction will be swift, and it is unclear who will be admitted or whether all 16 NATO members will favor Finland or anyone else in the foreseeable future, Finland's security option and strategy, however flawed, remains that outlined in 1992 in

a speech in Finland by Norway's then Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. He stated then that,

Closer cooperation means that the region will be more easily affected by developments in Russia, even if political events should take an unexpected turn. The best way for us to deal with such a situation is to ensure that the Nordic countries are firmly linked with broader-based European arrangements so that any pressure on the area is also regarded as a pressure on our partners in cooperation.⁷³

Even though Sweden has more than reversed its course towards security integration with Europe and Norway's voters rejected EU membership, those facts do not invalidate Stoltenberg's insights. Rather, Finland must redouble its efforts to stabilize Russia and the Baltic through its membership in the EU and integration with Europe because that is the only way it can avoid isolation next to Russia and/or peripheralization in Europe.

Finland and Russia.

The growing size of Russia's forces in the Northwest and Leningrad Military Districts (which has led Finland to oppose Russian efforts to revise the CFE Treaty's local provisions)⁷⁴ and the condition of the former Finnish province of Karelia on the Russian border remain serious international issues smoldering between Finland and Russia;⁷⁵ nevertheless, the quandaries posed by Russia's uncertain domestic evolution remain Finland's single greatest concern. These potential dangers include a breakdown of civil order inside Russia, major Russian threats to the Baltic states, or the possibility that a Russian reaction to a rash NATO expansion would place Helsinki in an isolated, but confrontational, posture *vis-a-vis* Moscow. While nobody imminently expects overt military threats against Finland as in 1939, or even the kinds of pressure exercised intermittently after 1944, the Russo-Finnish border and the Russian North have become more critical for Moscow, and troop strength there has been built up since 1991.⁷⁶

Many other negative alternatives, however, are possible. Tomas Ries has identified three broad categories of such nonmilitary alternatives, so-called "soft" crises, that would require substantial mutual political will to resolve over the long term lest they spawn bigger, more violent crises. The first set of problems, caused by the poverty gap between Russia (especially in its Northwest Provinces) and the EU with Finland, threaten the collapse of Russia's social infrastructure, either regionally or in general. Such a breakdown could trigger still greater criminal trans-border pathologies, massive ecological destruction, large-scale unregulated immigration, and a breakdown of Russian public health, which, in tandem with Russia's tremendous pollution problems, could trigger epidemics, pandemics, and general public panics.⁷⁷ While all the Scandinavian states are cooperating with Russia in projects to manage pollution, those projects are underfunded. The disorganized situation in Russia, and the unstable political order there have limited economic progress. A collapse of Russia's infrastructure could also assume the form of a new Chernobyl or major industrial accidents, e.g., when over 800 people sank on a ferry in the Gulf of Finland in 1994. The incidence of both petty and organized crime also is rising. The latter in particular poses difficult trans-border security problems, especially in view of the penetration of Russia's government by criminal elements. Any further erosion of Russia's social infrastructure that could bring about epidemics and unregulated large-scale immigration would certainly strain Finland's infrastructure and police forces. As Ries observes,

The main point to note being that the scale and intensity of all these problems would almost certainly increase as a function of greater economic hardship in Russia and/or further breakup of state structures. This would be complicated by the fact that various forms of crisis could begin interacting, generating new problems. Finally the situation would deteriorate further as the breakdown of organized life in Russia made it more difficult for the Nordic authorities to find counterparts with which to cooperate.⁷⁸

A second category of threats that could challenge Finnish security is the breakdown of Russia's political infrastructure, either on its own, or in tandem with these kinds of crises. As Chechnya shows, the potential for violence inside the Russian Federation remains high and recent events underscore that nuclear controls are not fully guaranteed.⁷⁹ Many different scenarios, like the October 1993 clash between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Parliamentary opponents, or the exacerbation of Chechnya or other ethno-political conflicts are all possible. While Russia's Northwest appears *relatively* calm, St. Petersburg obviously would be a glittering prize in the event of major conflict, and instability there instantly alerts Finnish policymakers.

However, the more likely threat is the further development of a hardening Russian policy based either on the military and defense industrial sectors or championing a fundamentally militarized view of European and Russian security.⁸⁰ That trend could easily harden into a lasting division of Russia and Europe, making Finland a "front-line state," exactly the opposite of Finnish goals. Perhaps the most dangerous manifestation of such trends would be the possibility of concerted Russian pressure, not just military but also economic, against the Baltic States, or worse yet a new attempt to annex them or curtail their sovereignty.

For these reasons Finland wants Russia integrated into Europe through as many channels as possible. Finland, as an experienced middleman in Russian trade and gateway to Russia, could benefit quite handsomely from expanded EU-Russian economic relations. President Ahtisaari recently attacked NATO expansion, and instead urged enlarging the EU, initiating a U.S.-Russian-EU "permanent political dialogue," and integrating Russia into the multilateral trading system from which it has been excluded, an exclusion that also greatly irks Russia.⁸¹ Another instance where Finland participates in a multilateral initiative to draw Russia closer to Europe is the Barents Sea Initiative, the result of a 1992 Norwegian proposal. As Norway's late Defense Minister Johann Jorgen

Holst observed before his untimely death in 1993, the Nordic states' main function, revealed in this initiative, is to create regional bases for stability in the North which will then influence broader European developments.⁸² And indeed, some observers of this initiative openly aspire that the cooperation generated here can provide the impetus for a "security community" starting in Europe's high north and spreading outward from there.⁸³

Finally, when on January 25, 1996, the Council of Europe voted to accept Russia as a member, President Ahtisaari and many Finnish Parliamentarians strongly supported this decision on the grounds that including Russia in organizations of multilateral European cooperation would be of the utmost importance for European stability. Not surprisingly, this stance annoyed Estonia's delegation, a sign of the diverging attitudes of Finland and its Baltic friends towards Russia.⁸⁴

Finland and the Baltic States.

Finland views the tension between Russia and the Baltic states as among the most critical of possible threats to its security. It works steadily, particularly with Estonia where it has special cultural ties, to stabilize the whole area. Finland pursues three main lines of policy that aim to prevent the area from becoming a source of tension in Europe. It uses economic, political, and low-level military cooperation to strengthen the new states' independence, promote their good relationship with Russia, and facilitate their integration with Europe through the EU.⁸⁵ It has worked to soften discord over borders and economic issues, preferring to see the problems of Russian minorities and soldiers stationed there resolved in an all-European context by international and OSCE mediation.⁸⁶

Finland would like for Baltic issues to be internationalized, i.e., discussed in the widest possible multilateral setting, preferably including the OSCE and the EU. This would ensure transparency, reassure all parties that they are not alone and that they can get a fair hearing,

and habituate them to purely political processes of conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, fact-finding, and verification. The Baltic states, unlike Finland from 1944-91, would then not have to face Moscow on their own, and grievances, real or imagined, would be dealt with openly and fairly.⁸⁷ Similarly, for the long term, Finland strongly urges that the Baltic states join the EU and be considered for membership on an equal basis with other Central European applicants as confirmed by the EU's Essen summit in 1994.

Nonetheless, the high level of animosity towards Russia and Russians, particularly in Latvia and Estonia, makes Finland's role of advising reconciliation very difficult, and Finnish officials hint at their and Europe's impatience with these Baltic policies.⁸⁸ This attitude naturally complicates Finland's advocacy role for the Baltic states in the EU, the Council of Europe, and other international agencies, where Baltic policies have aroused criticism. Nor does the visible decline in cooperation among the Baltic states aid Finland's efforts.⁸⁹ Certainly this impedes Finnish and other Scandinavian efforts to foster Baltic military cooperation and train officers there.

Essentially Finland would like to see the Baltic states profit from its example whereby Finlandization, a policy of carefully regulated "liturgical" friendship with Russia, provided a way to ensure the national defense by other means, e.g., avoiding deliberately provocative stances towards Russia.⁹⁰ This posture finds expression in the *White Paper* which openly calls for Nordic countries to help the Baltic states normalize relations with Russia to facilitate their integration with Europe and stabilize the whole region.⁹¹ Finland would also like Estonia and Latvia to arrange for the status of their largely stateless Russian population on a legislative basis conforming to the standards of the OSCE, Council of Europe, and international law.⁹² Finland has abetted this project in the past and stands ready to continue doing so.

Helsinki tries to focus the EU's political interest and resources on supporting the Baltic states' integration with the EU, and Europe in general, to develop the entire Baltic

region, including Russia. Finland considers such activity a key element in its regional security policy and a justification of its decision to join the EU.⁹³ To the degree that the Baltic states are truly in Europe, it then becomes harder for Russia to pressure them. The Baltic states will then feel more secure about their ability to defend their interests in a nonprovocative way because their EU membership will provide a form of economic-political deterrence and reassurance to Moscow and the Baltic capitals by helping to restrain everyone's moves.

Indeed, the most recent Finnish policy trend apparently now accepts that the Nordic states alone cannot guarantee the Baltic states' security. Therefore, if and when NATO expands, those states must not be left outside of the European security structure.⁹⁴ While this is not an endorsement of either NATO expansion or those states' inclusion in NATO, it does seem to represent a step forward from preexisting policy guidelines that invoked the need for the Baltic states to be integrated into Europe to admit that such integration also serves Finland's interests and to reject the apparent call by Russia's ambassador to Finland, Yuri Deriabin, that the Baltic states follow Sweden and Finland's neutrality.⁹⁵

Finland and Europe: Some Concluding Observations.

Finnish interest in the EU stands revealed as part of an evolving strategy to maximize its freedom of action and secure a real guarantee of security—self-defense—while contributing to and facilitating the long-term transformation of the broader European security system that could ultimately provide it with credible external guarantees. However, from today's vantage point, Finland's hopes for the EU/WEU can only be realized if these organizations clarify their real position on expansion eastward and form a meaningful defense arm in the WEU devoted to peacekeeping and crisis management. Finland could then participate in PfP and/or OSCE activities in regions such as Bosnia, and thereby strengthen its

military-political integration with the West. Since key EU members still show little practical inclination to reform the EU and overcome the obstacles to its economic-political expansion, and since the WEU remains unable to take advantage of U.S. support for European integration to create meaningful European military structures, Finland's insistence on a "lone wolf" defense policy appears eminently realistic.⁹⁶ But it comes at a price, especially if NATO expands and Russia reacts truculently.

Finland is not without a military option. It could consider a military alliance if threats arose because Europe's current security system is an interdependent one, i.e., nobody can act threateningly without affecting the whole system. Finland then would not be alone in making such a choice if new threats appeared. But, since Europe is, in fact, not actively considering implementing a common defense policy (as the language of Maastricht, the reality of the situation, and the dispensation given to Denmark not to join the CFSP all indicate), "progress in defence matters will occur in the form of crisis management, not in common defence."⁹⁷ This is still Finnish policy. And Finland's recommendations for the WEU appear more realistic for it than the WEU's previous efforts at rivalling NATO.

Nonetheless, partisans of the WEU as a separate European defense institution are not happy to acknowledge this reality unless France's rejoining of NATO's military system terminates the paralyzing debate over these institutions. This debate has obvious relevance for Finland since it has staked so much on demarcating the WEU from NATO. The WEU as NATO's rival cannot be justified merely as a matter of European states' dignity, especially since Finland or other small states near Russia need real guarantees if they renounce self-defense.⁹⁸ However, partisans of the WEU becoming a true European pillar naturally resent the attitude of the neutrals (or former neutrals), whom they regard as "free riders" on the EU/WEU, that demand commitments from Brussels and relevant capitals while they shirk making the same commitment to the EU and WEU.⁹⁹ NATO Secretary-

General Javier Solana, writing while still Spain's Foreign Minister, complained that some neutral EU members could prevent the WEU from implementing the EU's decisions with defense implications. He also questioned the notion that EU membership provided some sort of implicit security guarantee for states which are unable to accede to membership in WEU or NATO.¹⁰⁰

Such complaints, however, overlook Finland's dilemma, especially in view of Sweden's retreat on regional and European military-political integration. If Finland is to have real security, it must simultaneously embrace self-defense and economic-political integration, even if the seeming paradox overshadows attempts at logical analysis.¹⁰¹ As a recent analysis of European security issues observes,

The inherent diffusion of political power in European institutions simply denies the smaller countries an effective, unified role in the restructuring process. This realization spawns efforts by smaller states to strengthen smaller sub-regional organizations, but this will not ensure security structure emerging to fill the gap left by the dissolution of the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization]. None of the forums in Central Europe has been used to initiate local ideas on security management.¹⁰²

What then is left for Finland except self-defense and membership in the EU? This is particularly the case in Northern Europe given Norway's failure to join EU, Sweden's retreat from its policies of 1992-94, and the unresolved Baltic and Russian situations. A robust, independent self-defense is Helsinki's only credible card.

In the final analysis Helsinki long ago learned Wiktorin's lesson ("if you do not take care of your security no one else may care"¹⁰³) at profound cost. In small states, NATO membership is not a substitute for a rational security policy. If Europe and the West cannot meet today's challenges, Finland will be isolated and on the front line, obliged to meet them on its own. But if the EU and NATO can resolve those challenges and move towards a genuine pan-European system, Finland is admirably placed to move with them.

Finland's recent policies have overcome the solitude imposed upon it from 1944-91. Henceforth, Finland could likely have more real chances for security cooperation than ever before. While there are still some who cannot appreciate the magnitude of Finland's concerns or its achievements, European security policies that neglect Finnish thinking and experience injure not only Finland, but also Europe.

ENDNOTES

1. Risto E.J. Penttila, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe: A Historical Perspective*, Finnish Defence Studies No. 7, Helsinki: National War College, 1994, pp. 26-28; Jukka Salovaara, "Finish Integration Policy—From an Economic to a Security Motivation," *Yearbook of Finnish Policy*, 1993, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1993, p. 1.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 550-167, Eric Solsten and Sandra Meditz, eds., *Finland A Country Study*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, pp. 296-297.

3. Rene Nyberg, "The Baltic Countries and the Northwest of Russia: A European Challenge," *European Security*, Vol. III, No. 3, Autumn, 1994, p. 531; Osmo Apunen, "Finland and the Baltic Question," *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy*, 1992, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1992, p. 47. Apunen stated, "It must be admitted in all fairness that the Baltic nations' right to self-government and sovereignty was one of the key victims of Finland's own relationship with Soviet Union."

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5. Salovaara, p. 18.

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8. "Slow Haste," *The Economist*, May 20, 1995, pp. 50-51.

9. Timo Valtonen, "Economic Relations Between Finland and Russia: Business, Social Work or Debt Collection?," *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy*, 1992, p. 23.

10. Ronald Tiersky, *The Mitterand Legacy and the Future of French Security Policy*, McNair Paper No. 43, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995, p. 18. On page 60, Tiersky writes, "Integration in the EU equals national security because EU states could not countenance military force used against any member state, whether that state is a member of a corresponding military alliance or not."; Apunen, p. 48; Penttila, pp. 31-34; Heikki Haavisto, "Finland's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Choices and Challenges in a Changing World," *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy*, 1993, p. 5; Salovaara, pp. 16-23; Tomas Ries, *North Ho! The New Nordic Security Environment and the European Union's Northern Expansion*, Sankt Augustin, Germany: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1994, pp. 4-8.

11. Alpo Rusi, "Security Expectation of EU Applicant Countries: Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden," Paper Presented to the 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, March 28-April 1, 1994, pp. 2-3, 7-8.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-17. Ambassador Nyberg also shares this view. Nyberg, pp. 535, 540.

13. Rusi, pp. 5-9, 13-21.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4, 13-21.

17. Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in Finnish, August 15, 1993, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Western Europe*, (henceforth *FBIS-WEU*)-93-169, September 2, 1993, pp. 32-33; Penttila, pp. 31-34; Salovaara, pp. 16-23.

18. *Ibid.*; Koivisto, pp. 68-70; Penttila, pp. 26-28.

19. Penttila, p. 28.

20. Esko Antola, "The Burden of History: Finland as a Status Quo Country," *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, October-December, 1994, pp. 73-74.

21. Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in Finnish, November 12, 1994, *FBIS-WEU*-95-005, January 9, 1995, pp. 41-42.

22. Ries (pp. 27-47) and Nyberg (pp. 535-537) categorize the multiple types of such threats that might yet ensue; Tiersky (p. 60) quotes the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad as saying that for states like Finland, "EU membership is a matter of defending themselves against a possible new Russian threat."

23. Antola, pp. 71-75.

24. Salovaara, p. 21; Helsinki, *Suomen Kuvalehti*, in Finnish, October 6, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-217*, November 9, 1995, p. 18; Helsinki, *Suomen Kuvalehti*, in Finnish, April 28, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-103*, May 30, 1995, pp. 43-46; Hugh Carnegie, "Rainbow Coalition Is Chasing a Pot of Gold," *Financial Times Survey of Finland*, October 9, 1995; Helsinki, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, in Swedish, March 15, 1994, *FBIS-WEU-94-056*, March 23, 1994, pp. 35-36.

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31. Antola, p. 68; Copenhagen, *Berlingske Weekendavisen*, in Danish, May 11-18, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-111*, June 9, 1995, pp. 45-46; Nyberg, pp. 535, 540.

32. Penttila, pp. 31-32.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Jaakko Blomberg, "Finland's Evolving Security Policy," *NATO Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, February, 1993, pp. 12-15.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

37. Helsinki, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, in Swedish, June 5, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-110*, June 8, 1995, p. 37.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38. See also the articles in Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, of May 19 and May 30, 1995, in Finnish, *FBIS-WEU-95-115*, June 15, 1995, pp. 28-30.

39. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author, Helsinki, December, 1994. All subsequent interviews cited in these notes were conducted by the author at that time unless otherwise indicated.

40. Interviews with Finnish official by the author, Helsinki, December, 1994.

41. General Gustav Hagglund, "Finnish Defense Policy Aims to Protect Against External Pressures," *NATO Review*, Vol. 43, No. 4, July, 1995, p. 40; Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in Finnish, November 10, 1994, *FBIS-WEU-95-011*, January 18, 1995, p. 31.

42. Helsinki, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, in Swedish, May 22, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, June 30, 1995, p. 34.

43. Oslo, *Aftenposten Sondag*, in Norwegian, November 12, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-220*, November 15, 1995, p. 25.

44. *FBIS-WEU-95-217*, November 9, 1995, p. 18; Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in Finnish, October 14, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-217*, November 9, 1995, p. 19.

45. Stockholm, *Sveriges Radio Network*, in Swedish, September 22, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-185*, September 25, 1995, pp. 36-37. This was also already clear to some in 1993. For example, see Pekka Sivonen, in Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in Finnish, July 6, 1993, *FBIS-WEU-93-148*, August 4, 1993, pp. 46-47.

46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security in a Changing World: Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy: Report by the Council of State to the Parliament 6 June, 1995 (henceforth White Paper)*, Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995, pp. 13-16.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
50. "The Jane's Interview," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 22, No. 15, October 15, 1994, p. 56.
51. *White Paper*, pp. 22-23.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46, 58-60.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-60.
54. Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in Finnish, November 23, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-242*, December 18, 1995, p. 21.
55. *Ibid.*
56. Helsinki, *Helsingin Sanomat*, May 24, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-131*, July 10, 1995, pp. 37-38; *FBIS-WEU-June 30, 1995*, p. 34.
57. In this connection, France's recent rejoining of NATO's integrated military command might deal a body blow to the whole French inspired effort to make the WEU an alternative defense agency for Europe. Paris' decision evidently conforms to Finland's interests.
58. Martti Ahtisaari, "Finland, the European Union, and International Change," Address by the President of Finland at the Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany, November 23, 1994, pp. 3-5.
59. Penttila, p. 55.
60. Ries, pp. 7-8.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 8; *FBIS-WEU-95-110*, pp. 37-38; *FBIS-WEU-95-115*, pp. 28-30.
62. *FBIS-WEU-95-119*, pp. 38-39; *FBIS-WEU-95-131*, p. 37.
63. *White Paper*, pp. 45-46.
64. *FBIS-WEU-95-111*, pp. 46-47.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
66. Stockholm, *Svenska Dagbladet*, in Swedish, March 20, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-055*, March 22, 1995, p. 35.

67. Helsinki, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, in Swedish, October 8, 1993, *FBIS-WEU-93-220*, November 18, 1993, p. 57.

68. Helsinki, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, in Swedish, September 16, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-192*, October 4, 1995, p. 24.

69. *Ibid.* Lipponen's wariness about the WEU also emerges in Helsinki, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, in Swedish, May 12, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-126*, June 30, 1995, pp. 34-35.

70. Interviews with Finnish officials by the author, Helsinki, December 1994.

71. Nyberg, p. 539; Helsinki, *Suomen Yleisradio Network* in Finnish, September 22, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-185*, September 25, 1995, p. 36; Helsinki, *Suomen Yleisradio Network*, in Finnish, June 17, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-117*, June 19, 1995, p. 45.

72. Hansrudolf Kramer, "Finland's Search for Security," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, No. 11, November 1993, p. 10.

73. Thorvald Stoltenberg is quoted in Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander, "Conclusions," in Olav Schram Stokke and Ola Tunander, eds., *The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe*, London: International Peace Research Institute/Sage Publications, 1994, p. 235.

74. Ries, pp. 48-49; Nyberg, p. 539.

75. Ries, pp. 48-49. There are also recent charges that Finland has downplayed the Karelia issue in order to show the EU that it had no outstanding ethnic conflicts or issues that could provoke one. Blomberg apparently has conceded this in Helsinki, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, in Swedish, December 8, 1995, *FBIS-WEU-95-239*, December 13, 1995, pp. 20-21.

76. Ries, pp. 47-48.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-51. Ries provides analysis of all the possible threats or risks to Scandinavian security generally.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-46.

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE Sep 27, 1996		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final Report
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Finnish Security and European Security Policy (U)			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Stephen J. Blank				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ACN 96026	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The author discusses the evolution of Finnish views on the major issues of European security since 1992: Finland's relationships among the EU, WEU, and NATO; Baltic security; and Finnish relations with Russia. Finland's proximity to Russia makes its views and policies important. He concludes that Finland's policies indicate much about how European states view their own security agendas and the trends in European security, and show how judiciously conceived policies can expand the scope of security for small states in an uncertain environment.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Finland; European Union; Cold War; Soviet Union; Russia; United States; North Atlantic Treaty Organi- zation; Western European Union; Europe			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 45	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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